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Internet commerce continues to grow rapidly.  Over 60% of US households use 
the internet to shop online.  A secure payment protocol is required to support this rapid 
growth. A new payment protocol was recently invented at IBM.  We refer to the protocol 
as SPP or Secure Payment Protocol.   
This thesis presents a protocol analysis of SPP.  It is essential that a thorough 
security analysis be done on any new payment protocol so that we can better understand 
its security properties.  We first develop a method for analyzing payment protocols.  This 
method includes a list of desirable security features and a list of proofs that should be 
satisfied.  We then present the results of the analysis. These results validate that the 
protocol does contain many security features and properties.  They also help understand 
the security properties and identify areas where the protocol can be further secured.  This 
led us to extend the design of the protocol to enhance its security. 
This thesis also presents a prototype implementation of SPP. Three software 
components were implemented.  They are the Electronic Wallet component, the merchant 
software component and the Trusted Third Party component.  The architecture and 
technologies that are required for implementation are discussed.  The prototype is then 
used in performance measurement experiments.  Results on system performance as a 
function of key size are presented.  
Finally, this thesis presents an extension of SPP to support a two buyer scenario.  
In this scenario one buyer makes an order while another buyer makes the payment.  This 
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Internet commerce has been booming over the last few years and it continues to do 
so. To enable the rapid growth of internet commerce there is a need for a secure payment 
protocol.  A secure payment protocol is required to prevent the many types of fraudulent 
transactions that occur today.  Fraudulent transactions can occur by buyers who purchase 
goods and services online with a stolen credit card or by merchant impersonators who 
pose as legitimate merchants in order to obtain valid credit card numbers from 
unsuspecting shoppers.  When a problem does occur in a payment transaction between 
the participants, there is a need for a dispute resolution process.  A payment protocol 
must therefore provide for a way to resolve disputes.  There currently exist several 
payment protocols that are prevalent in the industry today that offer various levels of 
security.    Two popular protocols today are SET [SET] and Cybercash [Cybercash].  A 
new protocol has recently been invented at IBM.  This new protocol will be referred to as 
SPP [SPP] (Secure Payment Protocol) in this document. 
In a SPP payment transaction, a TTP (Trusted Third Party) acts as a mediator 
between the buyer and the merchant in order to facilitate payment transactions.  The 
protocol can be extended to multiple TTP's.  In this scenario the buyer would be 
represented by one TTP and the merchant would be represented by another TTP. 
 For any new payment protocol it is critical that a thorough security analysis be 
performed.   A security analysis should attempt to find any and all ways that the security 
of the protocol can be compromised and make recommendations to further enhance 
security of the payment protocol. 
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 This thesis has four main goals.  They are:  
1. design a method for performing a security analysis of a payment protocol and use 
this method to analyze the single TTP scenario of the SPP protocol, 
2. design and implement a prototype simulation of the single TTP scenario of the 
SPP protocol, 
3. evaluate the performance of SPP   using the prototype implemented, and 
4. design an extension to SPP that will support the multiple buyer scenario. 
 
Two approaches were taken to analyze a payment protocol.  The first approach 
involved creating a list of desired features of a secure payment protocol and analyzing 
how the SPP protocol supported each of these features.  Existing protocols were 
investigated and the desirable features of these protocols were used to create the list.  
These features include: 




5. Message Integrity, and 
6. Availability and Reliability. 
 
The second approach is what we call a proof analysis.  It involves creating a list of 
proof requirements for each participant involved in a payment transaction in order for 
them to feel secure and analyzing the payment protocol to determine if these 
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requirements are indeed satisfied.  As an example, the merchant requires proof that the 
customer has agreed to the terms and conditions of the order and authorized the 
transaction.  The reason the merchant requires an undeniable proof of this is that if a 
dispute arises in the future, it can easily be resolved.  This has the net affect of avoiding 
potential monetary losses as well as unnecessary problems. 
A prototype SPP payment protocol was implemented as part of this thesis.  The 
implementation uses a synchronous HTTP request/response architectural style to 
communicate messages between the participants in a SPP payment transaction.  To 
implement the prototype the following software systems had to be implemented: 
1. SPP Electronic wallet application used by the buyer or shopper, 
2. Simulation of a merchant commerce server running SPP merchant software, and 
3. TPP SPP server. 
The prototype was built using advanced technologies such as the IBM Java 
Cryptography Extensions API, which provides the PKCS cryptography algorithms used 
for signing messages and verifying signed messages, IBM XML 4J parser which parses 
and generates the XML SPP messages, Java Plug-in technology to implement the SPP 
electronic wallet application, eXtensible Schema Language or XSL to define the XML 
SPP messages, DB2 to be the data store,  Entity Enterprise Java Beans (EJBs) to act as 
the persistent code layer.  Entity EJBs are components defined in the J2EE specification 
that access data in a database in a transactional context. The application tools used to 
implement the prototype are, Visual Age for Java development environment for coding, 
Visual Age WebSphere Test Environment to execute and test the execution of the 
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payment system and Rational Rose Enterprise Edition to model the key java classes in the 
payment system using class diagrams. 
The prototype implemented was then used to do a performance analysis of the 
protocol.  The performance analysis focused on the impact of the use of digital signatures 
on the performance of the protocol.  We measured the performance for key sizes of 512 
bits, 1024 bits, 2048 bits and with digital signatures disabled. 
We have also extended the SPP protocol to support the 2 buyer scenario.  In a 2 buyer 
scenario, one person can order the goods or services and have another person actually pay 
for them.  This scenario is useful for providing merchant services such as gift certificates. 
The thesis is organized as follows.  Chapter 2 presents an overview of online payment 
authorization processing.  Chapter 3 presents an overview of two of the industry leading 
protocols, SET and Cybercash.   For each of the protocols the main features are discussed 
and a typical transaction scenario is described.  Chapter 4 describes the SPP protocol.  
Both the single TTP scenario and the multiple TTP scenarios are described.  Chapter 5 
contains the protocol analysis where security features of the protocol are discussed and 
analyzed. A proof analysis is performed and optional security enhancements are 
suggested.  Chapter 6 presents the design of the SPP prototype that was implemented as 
part of this thesis.  This includes a description of the software components that had to be 
built.  Chapter 7 contains the performance analysis while chapter 8 discusses the 
extensions to the protocol to support the 2 buyer scenario.  Conclusions and future work 
are discussed in Chapter 9. 
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2 Overview of Electronic Payment Processing 
Payment processing in the online world is similar to traditional methods of 
processing credit card payments.  In the online world, the store and the transaction are 
both virtual meaning that the card is "not present" in the transaction.  The merchant can 
not physically see the card and verify the customer's name or signature on the card.  In 
such a transaction, merchants are held liable for fraudulent transactions by the credit card 
companies.  Merchants must take additional steps against online fraud such as verifying 
that the credit card information is being submitted by the actual card owner and 
protecting their online store and network infrastructure against hackers.   
Payment processing can be divided into two major phases or steps: authorization and 
settlement.  Authorization verifies that the card is active and that the customer has the 
necessary funds available to complete the transaction.  Settlement involves transferring 
money from the customer's account to the merchant's account.  In this thesis we will 













A typical online payment authorization process is as follows.  In step 1 the customer 
decides to make a purchase on a merchant's web site and proceeds to check-out and 
provide his/her credit card information.  In step 2, the merchant's web site receives the 
customer order and payment information and sends the payment transaction information 
to the Payment Processing Gateway.  In step 3, the Payment Processing Gateway sends 
the payment information to the Issuing Bank of the customer's credit card.  In step 4, the 
Issuing Bank validates the payment information and sends the result, either an 
authorization number or a decline of payment to the Payment Processing Gateway who in 
turn passes the result to the merchant in step 5.  The complexity of the validation 
algorithm depends on the payment protocol used.  A simple form of validation would 
ensure that the billing address supplied by the customer along with the credit card 
information matches what the Issuing Bank has in its records.  A more complex 
validation would use cryptography techniques such as digital certificates, digital 
signatures and digests to verify that the customer is the legitimate owner of the credit 
card.  Finally in step 6 the merchant either accepts or rejects the transaction and ships the 
goods if necessary [VER1]. 
 
3 Overview of Existing Protocols 
An overview of some of the prevalent payment protocols will be discussed in this 
section.  The two main protocols discussed are SET and Cybercash as they share many of 




SET is a protocol whose specification was published by VISA and MasterCard on 
February 1, 2001.    The protocol’s security is based on RSA cryptography, which 
includes 56 bit DES and RSA public/private key pairs with 1024 bit modulus. 
 
3.1.1 Features of SET Protocol 
The features of the SET protocol will be discussed in this section. 
 
3.1.1.1 Confidentiality of Payment and Order Information 
Two types of information are typically exchanged in a payment transaction: 
Payment and Order information.  Payment information includes data such as payment 
method and payment method details.  An example payment method is credit card and its 
payment details are card type (e.g. Visa, MasterCard), card number and expiry date.  
Order information consists of the details of the order such as product names and numbers, 
descriptions, prices, quantities and terms and conditions regarding the order. 
The merchant cannot access the shopper's payment information. The shopper encrypts 
such information with the Payment Gateway's (acquirer bank’s) public key. As a result, 
only the payment gateway can view the payment information [SET1] [SET2]. 
The bank cannot access the shopper's order information as the bank never 
receives any information regarding the contents of the order.  The bank only receives the 




3.1.1.2 Integrity of Transmitted Messages 
The SET protocol is responsible for ensuring the integrity of the messages that are 
sent between the participants in a transaction.  Ensuring integrity means to ensure that the 
messages are not tampered with during transmission.  When a merchant submits a 
message to the bank the following occurs [SET2]: 
•  Merchant creates a DES symmetric key. 
•  Merchant signs the message with its private key then encrypts the resulting 
message with the DES symmetric key.  The resulting message will be referred to 
as (A). 
•  Merchant then encrypts (A) plus the DES symmetric key with the Banks public 
key-exchange key.  The resulting message will be referred to as (B). 
•  Merchant transmits (B) to the bank 
Only the bank can decrypt and view the message (B) and furthermore, the bank can 
verify that the contents of (B) were created by the merchant. 
 
3.1.1.3 Cardholder Authentication 
In SET, the cardholder is issued a digital certificate by his/her bank.  This digital 
certificate is the means by which the cardholder is authenticated.  It contains a digital 
signature signed by the bank which contains a digital hash of the card type, card number 
and expiry date.  The bank uses this information to verify that the payment information 
entered by the shopper is valid and that the shopper is using his/her own credit card.  This 
feature prevents the fraud situation where a shopper attempts to use a stolen credit card to 




3.1.1.4 Merchant Authentication 
The merchant is issued a certificate by the acquirer bank.  This certificate enables 
other parties to authenticate the merchant.  It contains information pertaining to the credit 
card brands (e.g. Visa, MasterCard) that the merchant can accept.  This feature reduces 
the chances of merchant fraud where an entity pretends to be a legitimate merchant to 
obtain valid credit card information and subsequently use it in fraudulent transactions. 
 
3.1.1.5 Interoperability Across Network and Software Providers 
SET is an open specification/standard.  Any software vendor can implement and 
sell their version of the product.  Example vendors include IBM, Oasis, etc. 
 
3.1.1.6 Protocol is not Dependant on Transport Security 
SET ensures that all transmitted messages are protected.  Therefore any transport 
protocols can be used to implement SET, e.g., HTTP, FTP and RPC. 
 
3.1.2 SET Transaction Scenario 
A typical SET payment transaction scenario [SET1] starts once the shopper notifies 




1. The shopper selects a credit card (VISA, MasterCard) for payment from those that 
can be used with their SET electronic wallet software. 
2. The shopper’s software initiates the payment process by sending a request to the 
merchant's software for the merchant’s and acquiring bank’s public keys.  
3. The merchant replies to the shopper with the requested information. 
4. The shopper's software verifies the merchant's and acquirer bank certificate.  It then 
generates two packets of information, order information and payment information. 
The order information is encrypted with the merchant’s public key and the payment 
information is encrypted with the bank’s public key, so only the bank can see it.  The 
shopper’s software transmits the encrypted order information and payment 
information to the merchant. 
5. The merchant verifies the message for tampering and then proceeds with requesting 
an authorization from the bank.  The merchant sends the bank a message containing a 
transaction id, the payment information provided by the shopper and the merchant’s 
certificate. 
6. The bank decrypts the message and checks to ensure that the transaction identifier in 
the authorization matches that in the buyer's payment information packet and that the 
merchant has not tampered with the data in the buyer's payment information packet. 
7. The acquirer bank then sends a request for payment authorization to the shopper's 
credit card issuer through customary bankcard networks. 
8. The issuing bank responds with either an approval or denial. 
 
 11
9. The acquirer bank generates an authorization response message to be returned to the 
merchant.  This message contains the issuing bank's response and an optional capture 
token to be used by the merchant when requesting capture of the payment. 
10. The acquirer bank encrypts and sends the authorization response message to the 
merchant's software. 
11. The merchant's software decrypts the authorization notice.  If the transaction is 
approved, the merchant's software creates a purchase response message and sends it 
to the buyer's software. This message informs the buyer that payment was accepted 
and that the product or service that he/she has purchased will be delivered. 
 
3.2 Cybercash 
Cybercash is a company that provides a gateway service between the internet and 
traditional credit card authorization networks [Cybercash]. The Cybercash protocol is 
also based on RSA cryptography, which includes 56 bit DES and RSA public/private key 
pairs with 1024 bit modulus. 
 
3.2.1 Features of Cybercash Protocol 
The features of the Cybercash protocol will be discussed in this section. 
3.2.1.1 Confidentiality of payment and order information 
The merchant cannot access the shopper’s payment information as it is encrypted 
with the shopper’s private key [CYBP].  Only the Cybercash server has the public key to 
decrypt the payment information.   
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The bank cannot access the shoppers order information as the bank never receives any 
information regarding the contents of the order [CYBP].  The Cybercash server has 
access to both order and payment information. 
 
3.2.1.2 Integrity of Transmitted Messages 
Cybercash uses DES symmetric key encryption along with RSA digital signatures 
to ensure that messages are not tampered with during transmission [CYBP].  The process 
to accomplishing this is very similar to that used in SET.  
3.2.1.3 Cardholder Authentication 
The cardholder is issued a digital certificate by Cybercash upon registration.  The 
Cybercash server maintains a record of public keys for all registered customers.  
Therefore, Cybercash can authenticate the cardholder, however, the merchant cannot 
[CYBP]. 
3.2.1.4 Merchant Authentication 
The merchant is issued a digital certificate by Cybercash upon registration.  The 
Cybercash server maintains a record of the public key of all registered merchants.  




3.2.2 Cybercash Transaction Scenario 
A typical Cybercash payment scenario starts once the shopper notifies the merchant 
of a willingness to pay for an order using the Cybercash payment method.  The 
transaction is described as follows: 
1. The merchant’s Cybercash software sends an invoice to the shopper's CyberCash 
electronic wallet software. 
2. The shopper selects a credit card from the ones bound to their wallet.  The shopper's 
Cybercash wallet then digitally signs and encrypts the invoice and credit card 
information with the key assigned to that Wallet-ID. The encrypted packet is sent to 
the Merchant's Cybercash payment server.  
3. The merchant digitally signs and encrypts the payment packet with its Cybercash key. 
The packet is sent to the Cybercash server. 
4. CyberCash decrypts the message and checks to make sure that the merchant has not 
tampered with the original invoice agreed upon by the shopper.  The credit card 
information is encrypted and sent over dedicated lines to the merchant's acquiring 
bank. 
5. The merchant's acquiring bank processes the merchant's request as it would for any 
other credit card transaction. It forwards the request through the card association’s 
network to the card issuing bank. 
6. The card-issuing bank sends an approval or denial code back to the acquiring bank. 
The acquiring bank then sends this code to Cybercash. 
7. Cybercash sends the merchant an encrypted message indicating success or failure of 
the credit card payment transaction. 
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8. The merchant’s software sends a message back to the shopper's Cybersash electronic 
wallet indicating success or failure of the payment transaction. 
 
3.3 Other Protocols 
3.3.1 SSL 
Merchant sites use SSL [SSL] to enable their clients to send payment information 
such as credit card numbers, in a confidential manner.   SSL provides many desirable 
properties for a payment system such as merchant authentication, client authentication 
(this is optional and in most cases not implemented), message integrity and 
confidentiality.  Since SSL is supported by major client applications –such as browsers 
from Microsoft, Netscape, and Mozilla, SSL security services are readily available to 
users worldwide, without the need to install any proprietary software to activate secure 
browser sessions with server applications for on-line shopping.   
 SSL runs on top of a reliable transport protocol, such as TCP/IP, and below any 
application protocol, such as HTTP, encrypting/decrypting and calculating/verifying a 
secure hash code of the application protocol byte stream to ensure its privacy and 
integrity. In the handshake phase of the SSL 3.0 protocol, the server sends its public key 
certificate to the client to prove its right to use the domain name and the company name 
and is authenticated to the client using a challenge-response mechanism with a public key 
algorithm (most commonly RSA).  The server's public key is also used to encrypt the 
client generated session keys and Message Authentication Code (MAC) computation 
which are subsequently sent to the server. MAC is a secure one-way hash-code computed 
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on the data being sent between sender and recipient to detect possible modifications on 
the data while in transit. SSL uses dedicated one-way hash functions - SHA or MD5, for 
MAC generation and verification. The recipient of the message recalculates the hash code 
on the received message and compares it with the received hash code. If the two hash 
codes are identical, the message is assumed to be "authentic". This assumption is based 
on the fact that no one else except the sender knows the shared secret key and so no one 
else can produce the correct hash code. Both the message and its MAC-code are 
encrypted with a symmetric algorithm to preserve the confidentiality of transactions. 
 Once the merchant has successfully received the payment information it can 
process the transaction.  In many cases a manual process is used.  For the case of 
payment by credit card, the merchant would call the credit card company to obtain an 
authorization code for the amount of purchase.  Subsequently the merchant can send a 
batch of credit card authorizations to the credit card company in order to capture the 
payment. 
4 Description of the SPP Protocol 
The features of the secure payment protocol (SPP) investigated in this thesis will be 
discussed in this section. 
4.1 Single TTP Scenario 
This section describes the SPP protocol for the single trusted third party (TTP) 
scenario.   In this scenario, the TTP is used by both the buyer and merchant in a payment 
transaction.  SPP requires the availability of a public key authority.  Any certificate 
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authority can be used, e.g., Pretty Good Privacy [PGP] and commercial providers such as 
Verisign [Ver]. 
 
The following notation is used in our description:  
CERTj j's certificate (j = b for buyer, j = m for merchant, j = t for TTP) 
H(x) a cryptographic digest of x 
Sj(y) Signature on y using private key of j (j = b for buyer, j = m for merchant, 
j = t for TTP) 
*abc abc is an optional field 
 
Table 4-1 Notation Used in Description of SPP Protocol 
The basic steps of the SPP protocol are shown in Figure 3-1.  For each step, any message 




















The following table gives a short description of each of the steps in the SPP protocol. 
 
Step Step Description 
1 buyer sends merchant an Order message 
2 merchant sends buyer an Order Payment Request message 
3 buyer sends TTP an Order Payment message 
4 TTP sends merchant an Order Confirmation Request message 
5 merchant sends TTP an Order Confirmation message 
6 Payment Confirmation Request/Payment Confirmation 
7 TTP sends merchant a Merchant Transaction Receipt 
message 
8 TTP sends buyer a Buyer Transaction Receipt message 
 
Table 4-2 Short Description of Steps in the SPP Protocol (single TTP Scenario) 
 
Each step is described in the following sections. 
 
4.1.1 Step 1: Buyer Sends Merchant an Order Message 
The buyer sends an Order message to the merchant.  The message contains the 
following information: 
•  items to be purchased 
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•  shipping information 
•  *previously quoted price 
•  *timestamp 
The timestamp is an optional field included to prevent a replay attack. 
 
4.1.2 Step 2: Merchant Sends Buyer an Order Payment Request 
Message 
The merchant, upon receiving the Order message, returns an Order Payment 
Request message to the buyer.  The Order Payment Request message contains the 
following information: 
•  transaction ID 
•  amount 
•  Order 
•  validity period 
•  CERTm 
•  *purchase agreement 
•  Sm(transaction ID, amount, Order, validity period, CERTm, *purchase agreement) 
 
The transaction ID is generated by the merchant and it is used by the merchant and 
the TTP to keep track of all the transactions.  The Order information is the same as that 
provided by the buyer.  The validity period specifies the time during which the payment 
must be confirmed.  The merchant certificate can be used by the buyer to verify the 
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signature of the merchant.  The purchase agreement is an optional field which contains 
information such as refund policy, product quality, warranty and other policies that are 
agreed upon.  A digital signature signed by the merchant is included as part of the 
message. 
 
4.1.3 Step 3: Buyer Sends TTP an Order Payment Message 
The buyer verifies the merchant's signature on the Order Payment Request 
message and proceeds by sending the TTP an Order Payment message.  The Order 
Payment message contains the following information: 
•  payment information 
•  amount 
•  merchant 
•  transaction ID 
•  CERTb 
•  *timestamp 
•  Sb(payment information, amount, merchant, transaction ID, CERTb, *timestamp) 
 
The payment information field contains information such as credit card number, 
credit card holder and expiration date.  The protocol is not limited to just processing 
credit card based payment transactions.  The payment information field can contain 
details about other payment instruments such as debit cards, electronic checks, electronic 
tokens etc.  The transaction ID is the same as that provided by the merchant.  The buyer's 
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certificate can be used by the TTP to verify the buyer's signature.  An optional timestamp 
may be included to prevent a replay attack.  A digital signature is also included. 
 
4.1.4 Step 4: TTP Sends Merchant an Order Confirmation Request 
Message 
The TTP verifies the buyer's signature on the Payment Request message and 
proceeds by requesting a confirmation from the merchant by sending an Order 
Confirmation Request message to the merchant.  The Order Confirmation Request 
message contains the following information: 
•  transaction ID 
•  amount 
•  status 
•  St(transaction ID, amount, status) 
 
4.1.5 Step 5: Merchant Sends TTP a Order Confirmation Message 
The merchant verifies the Order Confirmation Request message by verifying the 
transaction ID, amount and the TTP's signature.  The merchant then proceeds by sending 
an Order Confirmation message to the TTP.  The Order Confirmation message 
contains the following information: 
•  transaction ID 
•  amount 
•  status 
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•  Sm(transaction ID, amount, status) 
•  *(H(transaction ID, amount, Order, validity period, *purchase agreement), 
Sm(H(transaction ID, amount, Order, validity period, *purchase agreement))) 
 
As an option, a cryptographic digest of the transaction details as contained in the 
Order Payment Request message may be included.  This digest will be useful for 
dispute resolution purposes. 
 
4.1.6 Step 6: Payment Confirmation Request / Payment Confirmation 
Upon receiving the Order Confirmation message, the TTP requests the 
authorized amount from the payment centre.  The payment centre returns an approval to 
the TTP.  Any payment method can be used at this step.  The requirement for payment 
approval is tied to the TTP's policy.  It is possible that in some cases (e.g. for preferred 
customers) the TTP would not wait for credit approval, but would process the payment 
right away.  In this case, the TTP, rather than the payment centre, would be taking on the 
responsibility for the payment.  Furthermore, different TTP's may have different policies 
on handling unknown or delayed credit approval requests.  For example, if the approval 
request times out, the TTP may either refuse to process the payment or may take the risk 
of processing it.  Similarly, even if the payment centre rejects the request, the TTP still 





4.1.7 Step 7: TTP Sends Merchant a Transaction Receipt 
The TTP sends a signed Transaction Receipt message to the merchant.  The 
message contains the following information: 
•  payment ID 
•  transaction ID 
•  amount 
•  St(payment ID, transaction ID, amount) 
 
4.1.8 Step 8:  TTP Sends Buyer a Transaction Receipt 
The TTP sends a signed Transaction Receipt message to the buyer.  The message 
contains the following information: 
•  payment ID 
•  transaction ID 
•  amount, 
•  St(payment ID, transaction ID, amount) 
 
4.1.9 Additional Details about the Protocol 
After the TTP sends the buyer the Buyer Transaction Receipt message, the TTP 
captures the payment and transfers the funds to the merchant. This step happens offline 
and involves actual payment settlement.  For example, if the payment is by credit card, 
the TTP would be charging the card.  The specific payment capture process is beyond the 
scope of this thesis.  For example, the payment capture could be done weekly as a batch 
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job, or on a per-order basis. Also, the issue of how the TTP transfers funds to the 
merchant is beyond the scope of this thesis. 
The steps described above are sequential in nature. The payment transaction is not 
complete until the last step (TTP sends buyer a Buyer Transaction Receipt message) is 
performed. A timer is used at each step to protect against unusual situations where one of 
the parties (buyer, merchant, or TTP) is not proceeding with the next step within a 
predetermined time interval.  For Steps 1 to 6, if the timer expires, the transaction is 
assumed to be aborted. Any subsequent messages regarding this transaction will be 
ignored.  Up to Step 6, any party can abort the transaction by simply not continuing with 
the next step. 
At Step 7, if the merchant does not receive a receipt within a time-out period, the 
merchant attempts to obtain the receipt by sending a request message to the TTP. If a 
receipt is not received after a pre-specified number of attempts, the transaction is 
assumed to be aborted.  In this case, the buyer will not receive the order, but he/she can 
contact the TTP to request a refund. 
At Step 8, if the buyer does not receive a receipt within a time-out period, the 
buyer may request a receipt from the TTP at a later time. This would not affect the 
transaction because the order will be shipped by the merchant as long as the merchant has 
received the receipt. 
In case of dispute, the buyer has a signed payment request from the merchant and a 
signed receipt from the TTP.  The merchant has a signed receipt from the TTP.  The TTP 
has a signed payment from the buyer and a signed confirmation from the merchant.  The 




4.2 Extension to Two TTP's 
For the case of a single TTP, a conflict of interest situation may arise when a 
dispute arises between the buyer and the merchant.  This is because the TTP would be 
representing the interests of both parties.  For this reason, candidates for trusted third 
parties are typically organizations such as major banks or major credit card companies 
that have no obvious vested interest in supporting either party in a transaction. 
In some cases however, buyers and merchants may want to be represented by a 
trusted party that is more active in supporting their individual concerns, and perhaps is 
targeted specifically at providing services for their needs.  This can be realized by having 
two TTPs, one for the buyer (referred to as TTP-B), and the other for the merchant 
(referred to as TTP-M). In the case of dispute, TTP-B and TTP-M will be involved in 
dispute resolution, protecting the interest of the buyer and merchant respectively.  In 
addition, the protocol with two TTPs has the potential of allowing more types of 
organizations to assume the role of a trusted third party. 
The payment protocol can be extended to two TTPs.  The basic steps are illustrated in 























Figure 4-2 SPP Protocol with Two TTP's 
 
Step 1 consists of the buyer sending order information to the merchant via an Order 
message.  In step 2, the merchant requests payment from the buyer by sending the buyer a 
Payment Request message.  This message would contain the address of the merchant's 
TTP (TTP-M).  In step 3, the buyer sends the payment information to the buyer’s TTP 
(TTP-B).  This message would contain the address of TTP-M.  Step 4 consists of TTP-B 
sending a message to TTP-M regarding a confirmation from the merchant.  In step 5, the 
TTP-M requests a confirmation of the transaction and the amount of payment from the 
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merchant.   The merchant returns to the TTP-M a confirmation via the Confirmation 
Request message in step 6.  The TTP-M forwards the confirmation to the TTP-B in step 
7.  In step 8, the TTP-B gets a payment authorization from the payment centre.  In step 9, 
the TTP-B sends a receipt to the TTP-M confirming payment authorization.  In step 10 
and 11 the TTP-M forwards the receipt to the merchant and the TTP-B sends a receipt to 
the buyer respectively.  The message contents, together with the action taken by the 
buyer, merchant, TTP-B and TTP-M at the various steps are straightforward extensions 





5 Protocol Analysis 
5.1 Desirable Security Features of a Payment System 
In this section we discuss the desirable security features of a payment system.  
5.1.1 Dispute Resolution 
It is very common during a transaction that a dispute occurs between two or more 
parties.  Examples of typical disputes are: 
1. Seller does not ship the merchandise because seller claims the buyer has not paid for 
it. 
2. Buyer claims the seller shipped the wrong merchandise. 
3. Purchase agreement has been violated by either the seller or the buyer. 
4. Amount of transaction is in dispute. 
 
A payment system must provide a way to handle these types of disputes. 
 
5.1.2 Confidentiality 
Confidentiality means the restriction of knowledge about the various pieces of 
information related to a transaction [AsoS].  Such information includes the identity of 
payer/payee, purchase content, amount and so on.  Typically, the confidentiality 
requirement dictates that this information be restricted only to the parties involved.  
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However the requirement can be extended to further limit the knowledge to certain 
subsets of the parties only. 
 
5.1.3 Anonymity 
Some buyers prefer to keep their payment activities private.  They do not want 
parties not involved in their payment transactions to have access to order and payment 
information.  Often they prefer that the merchants and in some cases the banks to be 
incapable of observing and tracking their payments [AsoS].   There are two levels of 
anonymity: un-traceability [AsoS] and un-linkability [AsoS].   Un-traceability means that 
an adversary cannot determine a player’s identity in a run of the payment protocol.      
Un-linkability means that in addition, participation by the same player in two different 
payments cannot be linked. 
5.1.4 Non-Repudiation 
Non-repudiation means: 
•  A service that provides proof of the integrity and origin of data, both in an 
unforgeable relationship, which can be verified by any third party at any time; or, 
•  An authentication that with high assurance can be asserted to be genuine, and that can 
not subsequently be refuted [MacN]. 
 
The implication of a payment system that supports non-repudiation is that an action 
performed by any party in a transaction should not be able to be denied.  For example, if 
a merchant agreed to sell a set a goods or services for a specified price under the 
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specified terms and conditions, he/she should not be able to refute this agreement in the 
future.  The use of digital signatures enables this functionality.  Also a buyer that 
willingly agrees to the conditions of a contract should not be able to refute or deny that 
the agreement was ever made.  
5.1.5 Message Integrity 
The protocol must guarantee that the message content is not altered during 
transmission between a sender and receiver.  The message may contain information that 
is sensitive and private.  If a message is altered in any way during transport then the 
transaction will not be processed correctly.  Therefore the protocol must ensure that the 
information received matches the information sent. 
 
5.1.6 Availability and Reliability 
Payment transactions must be atomic.  They occur entirely or not at all, and they 
should never hang in an unknown or inconsistent state.   No payer would accept a loss of 
money due to a network or system crash.  Availability and reliability presume that the 
underlying network services and all software and hardware components are sufficiently 
dependable [AsoS].   
 
5.2 Analysis of SPP against Desirable Security Features 
In this section we analyze the SPP protocol to see how the desirable security features of a 
payment system are provided. 
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5.2.1 Dispute Resolution 
The SPP protocol messages sent between the different parties in a payment 
transaction are signed using digital signatures based on the PKCS #7 [PKCS7] standard.  
This provides a confidential audit trail for dispute resolution.  To demonstrate this, we 
will consider the scenarios mentioned above one at a time and see how the protocol deals 
with the problems. 
1. Seller does not ship the merchandise because seller claims buyer has not paid for it. 
For the first scenario, the TTP has proof that the payment has been authorized by 
the Payment Centre.  Upon receiving the SPP Order Confirmation message the TTP 
requests from the Payment Centre a payment authorization validation.   The Payment 
Centre would respond to the TTP with a message containing the results of the request, 
either successful or unsuccessful.  If successful an authorization code is also provided.  
The TTP stores the messages to and from the Payment Centre in its secure database for 
audit trail purposes. Once the payment authorization code has been received by the TTP, 
the TTP has proof that the payment has been assured to the seller.   Once, the payment 
has been assured to the seller it is up to the seller to capture the payment and there is 
nothing to stop the seller from doing so. 
2. Buyer claims the seller shipped the wrong merchandise.   
For this second scenario, assuming the transaction has completed successfully, the 
buyer has a signed SPP PaymentRequest message from the merchant that contains the 
order details.    The buyer can present this information to the merchant along with the 
packing slip to prove to the merchant that the wrong merchandise was shipped. 
3. Purchase agreement has been violated by either the seller or the buyer. 
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The merchant sends to the buyer a signed OrderPaymentRequest message that 
contains the purchase agreement information.  The buyer would review the contents of 
this message and if the terms and conditions of the order are acceptable, then he/she 
would submit a signed OrderPayment message to the TTP.   If the transaction has 
completed successfully then the above steps were guaranteed to have taken place which 
prove that both the buyer and the merchant have agreed to the terms of the order 
including the purchase agreement. More specifically, the buyer has a copy of the 
OrderPaymentRequest message.  This message is signed by the seller and it can be 
used to provide undeniable proof that the merchant has agreed to the terms of the order.  
The TTP has a copy of the OrderPayment message that is signed by the buyer.  The 
merchant can present this as undeniable proof that the buyer has agreed to the terms of 
the order. 
Note that there is no message that explicitly contains the purchase agreement 
signed by the buyer.  The buyer signs the OrderPayment message which has the 
transaction id field in it and this id can be used to reference the OrderPaymentRequest 
message which does contain the purchase agreement information.  The transaction id 
reference is sufficient to link together all of the SPP messages for a given transaction. 
4. Amount of transaction is in dispute. 
The resolution of this dispute would be similar to the third scenario.  Additionally, 
for this scenario, the amount of the transaction is explicitly signed by both the merchant 
and the buyer.  The merchant signs the amount information in the 
OrderPaymentRequest message and the buyer signs it in the OrderPayment message. 
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Furthermore, a SPP payment transaction includes a TTP (trusted third party) who acts as 
an impartial player in the transaction.  The TTP can be called upon to help settle disputes. 
5.2.2 Confidentiality 
There are essentially two types of information encapsulated in the SPP protocol 
messages.  They are 1) order information and 2) payment information.  Order information 
includes information such as the product list, the prices of the products, the purchase 
agreement and shipping information.  Payment information consists of the payment 
method and details of payment. Credit card is an example of a payment method and the 
card number, expiry date, and amount are payment details.  To analyze the confidentiality 
feature of a payment protocol we need to analyze who has access to these two types of 
information.   
 We first check whether anyone other than the participants of a transaction (buyer, 
merchant, TTP) can access any of the information in the transaction.  There are two 
places where the confidentiality of SPP messages may be compromised.  They are, 
during transmission and while stored in a database (e.g. TTP stores SPP messages in a 
database for audit trail purposes).   
The protocol states that during transmission, the SSL protocol [SSL] is used to 
encrypt the message.  The message is secure during transmission as SSL employs 128 bit 
DES synchronous cryptography for encryption. However, once the message reaches its 
destination, it is no longer in an encrypted state.   The problem arises when a message 
gets sent to an incorrect destination.  The receiver of the message would be able to fully 
view the details of the message.  This security hole is discussed in more detail in section 
5.4.1 entitled "Potential for Compromised SPP Messages". 
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 The second place where the confidentiality of a SPP message could be 
compromised is while it is stored in the database.  The TTP is required to store the SPP 
messages in order to maintain an audit trail for dispute resolution purposes.  The protocol 
does not discuss the details of how the message should be stored in a database.  If the 
SPP messages were stored in raw form, then any TTP database administrator (DBA) with 
access to the database would be able to view the details of the messages.  Therefore, a 
dishonest TTP DBA would be able to steal sensitive data such as credit card information.  
Also, an unauthorized individual who happens to break into the DBA's account will gain 
access to the database.  This security hole is discussed in more detail in section 5.4.2 
entitled "Un-trusted TTP Database Administrator". 
Now let’s examine which parties involved in a transaction can access the various 
pieces of information, specifically order and payment information.  Note that only the 
merchant and the buyer can access the order information.  The TTP only has a digest of 
the order information; therefore the TTP is not able to view the order details.  Note also 
that only the buyer and the TTP can access the payment information.  The buyer sends 
the payment information to the TTP via the Order Payment message; therefore the 
merchant is not involved in the collection of the payment information.   
The identities of the parties involved in a SPP transaction are uniquely identified.   
The use of digital certificates ensures that this is the case.  The digital certificates of each 
party are exchanged during a run of a SPP payment transaction.  A digital certificate that 
is issued by a respectable certificate authority uniquely identifies the party. 
 
The following table summarizes the confidentiality features of the SPP protocol: 
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Description of Confidentiality Requirement Is Requirement 
Satisfied by SPP 
Protocol? 
Information is restricted to only the parties involved in transaction. Partial.  (See table 
below for further 
details.) 
Information is restricted to only parties involved in transaction and 
information is further restricted to a subset of the parties. 
Yes 
Order information is available to only the buyer and the merchant Yes 
Payment information is available to only the buyer and the TTP Yes 
Identity of payee/payer is known. Yes 
Table 5-1 Summary of SPP Confidentiality Analysis 
The following table lists scenarios and states whether or not the confidentiality is 
preserved. 
SPP Message Confidentiality Scenarios  Is 
Confidentiality 
Preserved? 
During transmission and message delivered at proper destination Yes 
During transmission and message delivered at improper destination No 
SPP message stored in TTP database and TTP DBA is honest Yes 
SPP message stored in TTP database and TTP DBA is dishonest No 
SPP message stored in TPP database and TTP DBA user account is 
compromised 
No 





The first anonymity requirement is un-traceability.  It states that an adversary 
should not be able to determine a party’s identity in a run of the payment protocol.  In the 
SPP protocol, the identities of the parties are known since digital certificates are used for 
authentication. The identities of the parties can be determined by an adversary if the 
adversary can gain access to the SPP messages.  This is because digital certificates are 
embedded within these messages.  There exist two places where access can be gained to 
the SPP messages.  They are during transmission and from the database, assuming the 
database is not secured. 
The SPP messages are protected during transmission by the SSL protocol. We can 
therefore assume that these messages will be protected during transmission.  However, 
there is still a possibility for an SPP message transmitted using SSL to be compromised 
by an attack called a Man-in-the-Middle attack.  This is discussed further in the section 
5.4.1 entitled “Potential for Compromised SPP Messages”. 
A secure database is required to prevent a dishonest DBA from tampering with 
the data.  The un-trusted DBA security hole is discussed further in the section 5.4.2 
entitled “Un-trusted TTP Database Administrator”.   
The second anonymity requirement is un-linkability.  It states that participation by 
the same party in two different payment transactions cannot be linked.  In the SPP 
protocol, the merchant and the TTP can link multiple buyer transactions together.  The 
merchant can do this only if multiple transactions of the buyer involve that merchant.  An 
adversary cannot link two buyer transactions unless the adversary has access to the 
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messages of the SPP protocol.  The un-linkability requirement will be met if the security 
enhancements discussed in section 5.4 entitled “Discussion of Security Enhancements to 
Protocol” are implemented. Without that enhancement, the SPP protocol cannot claim 
that the requirement of un-linkability is satisfied completely. 
The following table summarizes the anonymity features of the SPP protocol: 
 
Description of Anonymity Requirement SPP 
Protocol 
Support 
Un-traceability – untraceable by parties within transaction No 
Un-traceability – untraceable by an adversary not involved in transaction Partial  
Un-linkability -  un-linkable by parties within transaction No 
Un-linkability – un-linkable by an adversary not involved in transaction Partial 
Table 5-3 Summary of SPP Anonymity Analysis 
5.2.4 Non-Repudiation 
Non-repudiation is enabled in the SPP protocol through the use of digital 
signatures.  Every message except for the initial Order message sent by the buyer to the 
merchant is signed using a digital signature. A digital signature provides proof of the 
originator of the message and the integrity of the message content.  Therefore, the 
originator of the message cannot claim that the message was altered in any way or that 
the originator is someone else.  For example, a buyer cannot claim that he/she did not 
agree to the details of the transaction.  This is because the buyer has sent to the TTP a 
signed OrderPayment message which contains a transaction id, which can be used to 
link all the SPP messages of a transaction together.   Therefore, it would be impossible 
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for the buyer to dispute the details of a transaction.  The same principle holds true for the 
merchant thereby protecting the buyer. 
This requirement can only be broken if the validity of the digital signatures is 
compromised.  This is possible in the SPP protocol.  In Section 5.4.4 entitled “Validity of 
Digital Signatures”, we discuss how digital signatures can be compromised and ways to 
secure them in order to enhance the security of the SPP protocol. 
 
5.2.5 Message Integrity 
Message integrity is supported in the SPP protocol, by means of digital signatures. 
For example the SPP Order Payment message which is sent by the buyer to the TTP, 
consists of the following: 
 
•  payment information 
•  amount 
•  merchant 
•  transaction ID 
•  CERTb 
•  *timestamp 
•  Sb(payment information, amount, merchant, transaction ID, CERTb, *timestamp) 
 
The buyer calculates a message digest or hash value of the message (Order Payment).  
The buyer signs the message digest with the buyer's private key and sends the signed 
digest along with the original Order Payment message to the TTP.  The TTP uses the 
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sender's public key to decrypt the signed message digest that was received. It also 
performs a separate calculation of the message digest from the received Order Payment 
message.  If there is a match between the two message digests, then the TTP has verified 
that the message has not been altered.  Since the buyer's public key was used for the 
decryption, the TTP has also verified that the originator of the message is the buyer. 
The above feature can only be broken if the validity of the digital signatures is 
compromised.  As mentioned previously, this issue will be discussed in Section 5.5.4. 
5.2.6 Availability and Reliability 
The underlying technology must be reliable in order for the SPP protocol to be 
reliable.  The underlying technology includes internet technologies such as TCP/IP, 
HTTP, database such as DB2 [IBM DB2] and RSA PKCS [RSA][PKCS7] cryptography.  
It is inevitable that any one of the above technologies will fail at some point in time.  
Therefore contingency must be built into the system.  For example what will happen if a 
network failure occurs, or the merchant or TTP database becomes corrupted or a security 
hole is discovered in the cryptography algorithms.  For this thesis we will assume that all 
the underlying technology can be made reliable through techniques such as redundancy 
so if one system component fails, a backup will automatically kick in.   
If a security hole is found in the cryptography algorithms, then the whole protocol 
breaks down.   However, the RSA [RSA] cryptography algorithms have so far stood the 
test of time, therefore it is fair to assume at this time that they are indeed reliable and 
secure for all practical purposes.  
To analyze the requirement that each transaction must be atomic, we need to 
determine the point at which the transaction is completed, and examine the scenarios that 
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can cause a transaction to be aborted.  A SPP transaction is considered complete once the 
TTP sends a Transaction Receipt message to the merchant and the merchant receives 
this message successfully.  At this point, the merchant has confirmation from the TTP 
that the payment has been authorized and is waiting to be captured.  The merchant would 
now typically ship the goods to the buyer.  Some scenarios that can prevent a transaction 
from completing are listed in the table 4-4. 
SPP Transaction Abort Scenarios Behavior of the SPP Protocol 
Network stops functioning in the 
middle of a SPP transaction.  (Example: 
the network fails after the TTP sent the 
OrderConfirmationRequest message 
to the merchant.) 
The SPP protocol has a built in time out 
mechanism.  Each event triggers the starting of 
a timer.  Sending a message is an example of 
an event.  If a response is not received before 
the timer expires then the transaction is 
aborted.  In the example, the TTP will wait for 
a pre-determined amount of time for an 
OrderConfirmation response message from 
the merchant.  If no response is received then 
the SPP transaction is aborted. 
Merchant decides to abort transaction. 
(Example, merchant does not send a 
OrderConfirmation response message 
to the TTP.) 
The merchant can abort the transaction by 
simply choosing to not reply to a SPP message 
it has received. In the example, the merchant 
decides not to send an OrderConfirmation 
response to the TTP thereby causing the TTP 
to mark the transaction as aborted. 
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SPP Transaction Abort Scenarios Behavior of the SPP Protocol 
Buyer decides to abort transaction. 
(Example, buyer receives the 
OrderPaymentRequest message 
from the merchant and decides not to 
send an OrderPayment message to the 
TTP.) 
The buyer also has the ability to abort the 
transaction.  This is accomplished by simply 
not sending an OrderPayment message to the 
TTP. 
Table 5-4 SPP Transaction Abort Scenario Analysis 
 
5.3 SPP Proof Analysis 
In this section, we present a proof analysis of the SPP protocol.  The main purpose 
of this analysis is to enumerate the various pieces of proof that each party requires in a 
SPP transaction in order to feel secure and confident about the transaction.   It is also a 
good way to find security holes in the protocol. A summary of the proof analysis is 




Actor Description of Requirement 
Supported 
By SPP Discussion 
TTP Proof Buyer has 
authorized 
transaction 
Yes Buyer sends a signed 
OrderPayment message to TTP 
 Proof Merchant has 
authorized 
transaction 
Yes Merchant sends a signed 




Actor Description of Requirement 
Supported 
By SPP Discussion 
Merchant Proof Buyer has 
authorized 
transaction 
Yes The merchant does not have direct 
proof of this. Only the TTP does.  
The merchant would have to 
contact the TTP in this case to get 
the direct proof, which consists of a 
signed OrderPayment message 
that the buyer sends to the TTP. 
 Proof TTP has 
authorized 
transaction 
Yes TTP generates a 
TransactionReceipt message and 
sends it to the merchant 
 Proof Buyer is 




The TTP is responsible for getting 
the credit card authorized; therefore 
the risk for a fraudulent transaction 
would have to be negotiated 
between the TTP and the merchant.  
The only information the TTP has 
to validate the credit card is the 
buyers digital certificate.  From the 
certificate one can extract buyer 
information such as the name.   
Assuming the certificate is valid, 
the TTP can verify that the name on 
the credit card is the same as the 
name associated with the buyer’s 
digital certificate.  This information 
would be sent to the payment center 
along with the payment information 
as the payment center is ultimately 
the one who does the validation. 





If the buyer’s certificate is 
compromised (i.e. gets into 
someone else’s hands) then 
someone other then the buyer can 
make unauthorized payments that 
appear to be authorized.  See 
section 5.3.4 for discussions on  
how to handle situations when a 
digital certificate has been 
compromised. 
 Proof of Merchant 
accreditation 
Yes The Merchant has to register with a 
TTP.   Therefore the TTP would 
perform a screening process on the 
merchant before processing 
transactions for the merchant.   
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Actor Description of Requirement 
Supported 
By SPP Discussion 
Buyer (cont) Proof TTP has 
authorized the 
transaction 
Yes The TTP sends the customer a 
signed Receipt of the transaction. 
 Proof Merchant has 
authorized 
transaction 
Yes The merchant sends the customer a 
signed OrderPaymentRequest 
message also the merchant sends 




Proof Buyer is 
legitimate owner of 
the credit card. 
Limited 
Support 
Same discussion as for the 
merchant. 
Table 5-5 SPP Proof Analysis 
 
5.4 Discussion of Security Enhancements to Protocol 
In this section we present security enhancements that can be made to the protocol.  
There are many levels of security. Let's use a single family home as an analogy.  The 
home would most likely have at least a single lock on every door of the house.  In many 
cases this would be an acceptable level of security.  However, if you want to add 
additional security to the home there are many enhancements that could be made such as 
putting an additional chain lock on every door, installing metal bars on the windows, 
installing motion detectors in the home, installing a closed circuit video and so on.  In this 
section we propose methods to provide additional levels of security to the protocol.  Our 
approach is to list the possible security exposures to the protocol and present a solution to 




5.4.1 Potential for Compromised SPP Messages 
A SPP message can be compromised if the message can get into the possession of 
an unwanted entity and the details of the message can be accessed by that entity.   To 
analyze this problem, we examine the scenario where the buyer sends the TTP an 
OrderPayment message.  This message contains sensitive payment information 
belonging to the buyer.  The protocol states that the message is sent by the buyer to the 
TTP using SSL.  There will be no problems if we can guarantee that the TTP is the one 
receiving the message.  The message is encrypted during transport so that it cannot be 
compromised.   
Suppose someone other then the TTP has received or intercepted the message.  
The message is now compromised because once the message is received, it is no longer 
in an encrypted state.   The question to ask is how can someone other then the TTP 
receive or intercept the message when SSL is used as the secure transport protocol?   
There is an attack called a “man-in-the-middle” [SSLIntro] attack where such a situation 
can happen.  The man-in-the-middle is a rogue program that intercepts all communication 
(via SSL) between the client and the server.  This rogue program intercepts the legitimate 
keys that are passed back and forth during the SSL handshake, substitutes its own, and 
makes it appear to the client that it is the server, and to the server that it is the client 
[SSLIntro].   
The encrypted information exchanged at the beginning of the SSL handshake is 
actually encrypted with the rogue program's key, rather than the client's or server's keys. 
The rogue program ends up establishing one set of session keys for use with the server, 
and a different set of session keys for use with the client. This allows the rogue program 
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not only to read all the data that flows between the client and the server, but also to 
change the data without being detected.  To prevent this problem, the client should 
perform an additional check that is not covered in the SSL protocol. Specifically, the 
client should check that the domain name in the server’s certificate is the same as the 
domain name of the server with which the client is attempting to communicate 
[SSLIntro].  If this is not the case, then all communication should be halted immediately. 
Another solution to the above problem involves applying the cryptographic 
concept of enveloping the data.  This can be accomplished by using the PKCS7 
EnvelopedData class.   This class encrypts the signed message with the public key of the 
recipient so that only the recipient can decrypt the message using its private key.  For 
example, the buyer would encrypt the signed OrderPayment message using the public 
key of the TTP, and then send the message to the TTP.   Only the TTP can access the 
details of the message because only the TTP's private key can decrypt the message.  Note 
that if all SPP messages are enveloped while being transported, then the SSL protocol is 
no longer needed.  Any unsecured transport mechanism can be used for transmitting SPP 
messages. 
 
5.4.2 Un-trusted TTP Database Administrator 
The TTP stores the SPP messages that it sends or receives into its database for a 
period of time for audit trail purposes, e.g., OrderPayment, OrderConfirmation, 
OrderConfirmationResponse and OrderPaymentRecipt.  These messages contain 
sensitive data, especially the OrderPayment message which contains payment 
information of the buyer.  If these messages are stored into the database without being 
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encrypted then the data in the messages are not protected from an untrustworthy TTP 
database administrator (DBA).  There is nothing stopping the TTP DBA from viewing 
the contents of the SPP messages and stealing credit card numbers for fraudulent use. 
 To solve this problem, the TTP should encrypt each SPP message with its public 
key before storing the message into the database.  To view the contents of the SPP 
messages in the database, the messages would first have to be decrypted using the private 
key of the TTP.  Of course the TTP DBA would not have access to this private key and 
therefore the data would be protected.  
5.4.3 Unauthorized Access to TTP Database Server  
If an unauthorized person gains access to the TTP Database server then they 
would be able to view the details of all the SPP messages that have been sent and 
received by the TTP.  This would be a major security problem for the TTP. 
 How could an unauthorized person gain access to the TTP Database Server?  The 
most common way is for someone to obtain a valid username and password for the 
system.  There are many ways that this can be done.   Since our goal is to protect the data 
in the database, we can use the same solution as for the “Un-trusted TTP Database 
Administrator” situation.  This means that the TTP should encrypt the SPP messages 
before storing them in the database, using the public key belonging to the TTP.  As a 
result, these messages can only be decrypted with the private key of the TTP.  
5.4.4 Validity of Digital Signatures 
If the validity of the digital signatures become compromised then the message 
integrity, non-repudiation and hence the dispute resolution properties of the protocol will 
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be lost.  This subsection discusses ways in which digital signatures can become invalid 
and suggests methods that can be applied to the protocol to further secure it. 
The timestamps on the SPP messages acts as a critical piece of information to 
maintain the validity of digital signatures [ZhouO].  It should be generated by an online 
timestamp authority such as DigiStamp [DigiStamp].  As an example, for the SPP Order 
Payment message, a signed timestamp can be added as follows.     
1.   B -> TS:   Sb(payment information, amount, merchant, transaction ID, CERTb) 
2.   TS -> B:  Ts, STS(Sb(payment information, amount, merchant, transaction ID, CERTb), Ts) 
 
The buyer (B) sends the timestamp authority (TS) a signed Order Payment 
message.  The TS adds a timestamp to the buyer's signed message.  
All signed SPP messages should contain a timestamp from a timestamp authority.  This is 
because if a private key or the signing key of one of the participants of a SPP transaction 
becomes compromised, the digital certificate of that participant needs to be revoked.  
Once the digital certificate has been revoked all messages signed with that signing key 
should no longer be valid.  When a signed message is being verified, the verifier should 
check the Certificate Revocation List to see if there exists a record of the revoked 
certificate.  If the time of revocation is before the timestamp on the signed message then 
the signature will be deemed invalid [ZhouO]. 
5.4.5 Validity of Digital Certificates 
The security of the SPP protocol depends on digital certificates for authentication and 
on signature services for the participants in a transaction.  A digital certificate can 
become invalid because: 
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•  The private key corresponding to the public key in the certificate may be lost or 
compromised [LeviR], 
•  The Certificate Authority’s (CA’s) signature key may be compromised [LeviR], 
or 
•  The certification contract may be terminated or the certificate holder’s status and 
abilities described in the certificate may change or may be cancelled [LeviR]. 
 
The SPP protocol must specify how to check and verify the validity of digital certificates 
as it is inevitable that these certificates become invalid.   The concept of certificate 
revocation was introduced into PKI (Public Key Infrastructure) based systems for this 
reason.  The best-known revocation mechanism is the Certificate Revocation List (CRL), 
which keeps a signed list of the serial numbers of revoked certificates. Usually, the CA is 
the signer of the CRL for the certificates that it issued [LeviR].  The verifier of a digital 




6 Design of SPP Prototype 
The SPP Protocol prototype that was implemented as part of this thesis supports the 
single TTP scenario. 
6.1 Description of SPP Prototype Software Components   
6.1.1 Software Components on Buyer Computer 
The software components required on the buyer’s computer are: 
•  Web browser such as Internet Explorer or Netscape. 
•  SPP Electronic Wallet Browser Plug-in Application. 
 
A web browser such as Internet Explorer or Netscape is a standard client application 
that allows a buyer to interface with a merchant's web storefront in order to browse 
catalogs and create orders.  The SPP Electronic Wallet Browser Plug-in application is 
based on the Java Plug-in 1.3 [JavaPlugin] specification.  This application is used to sign 
the messages that the buyer sends to the merchant and the TTP.   It also performs 
signature verification on the messages it receives.  These are the functions that enable 
some of the security features of the protocol.    The wallet application is launched 
automatically when the buyer’s computer receives an OrderPaymentRequest message 
from the merchant.    
The scenario can be described as follows: 
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•  The buyer (or shopper) is shopping at a merchant’s web storefront and decides to 
submit an order to the merchant by sending an Order message to the merchant. 
•  The merchant, upon receiving the Order message, verifies it and redirects the shopper 
to the OrderPaymentRequest.jsp page which launches the SPP Wallet application in 
the shopper’s browser.   The wallet receives the Order Payment Request message 
from the merchant, verifies the message and displays the contents of the message for 
the shopper to see.  The contents displayed include the details of the order. 
•  The shopper verifies that the information displayed in the wallet is correct and presses 
the submit button on the wallet which generates an Order Payment message that is 
sent to the TTP. 
 In our implementation, it is assumed, for simplicity, that the URL of the TTP is known to 
both the merchant and the buyer. 
 
6.1.2 Software Components on Merchant Commerce Server 
The basic function of a merchant commerce server is to enable buyers to browse 
its catalog and place orders.  The software components needed for the implementation of 
the prototype are: 
•  simulation of a commerce server 
•  SPP Merchant software 
 
For the prototype a simulation of a merchant commerce server was implemented.   
The simulation deals with the tasks related to the submission of an order by a buyer and 
certain merchant related payment processing tasks.  Therefore, the simulation does not 
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support browsing of catalogs, adding products to shopping carts or any task that would be 
done prior to submitting an order.  The simulation is based on the IBM WebSphere 
Commerce Suite (WCS) V5.1 product [IBMWS] and consists of the following two 
commands: 
•  OrderProcess 
•  OrderConfirm 
 
OrderProcess is used to submit an order. When the buyer submits an order, the client 
software calls the OrderProcess command and passes to it the SPP Order message.     
The OrderConfirm command does not exist in the WCS product.  It has been 
added specifically to support the SPP protocol.  The purpose of this command is to 
confirm the details of the order for the TTP during a SPP payment transaction.   The TTP 
would send the merchant an Order Confirmation Request message via a call to the 
OrderConfirm command.  The OrderConfirm command processes the Order 
Confirmation Request message and if all is valid a response is sent back to the TTP 
consisting of the Order Confirmation message. 
The SPP merchant software is a software component that plugs into the commerce 
server.    This component performs the following services: 
•  Maintaining the integrity of the SPP protocol, 
•  Preparing and processing SPP merchant related messages, 
•  Signing the messages that are sent, and 




6.1.3 Software Components on TTP SPP Commerce Server 
The software components required on the TTP Commerce Server are: 
•  WebSphere Commerce Suite [IBMWS] 
•  This software product provides a transaction based electronic commerce platform.  
In our prototype this product was not used but some of the necessary functions 
were simulated. 
•  SPP TTP Software 
•  When installed on the TTP SPP Commerce Server, the software handles all the 
TTP related activities such as 
o Maintaining the integrity of the SPP protocol,  
o Preparing and processing SPP TTP related messages, 
o Signing the messages that are sent, and 
o Verification of messages received. 
6.2 Architecture and Design of SPP Prototype Components 
6.2.1 SPP Electronic Wallet Browser Plug-in Application 
A high-level architecture of the SPP Electronic Wallet Browser Plug-in 
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Figure 6-1 High level architecture of the SPP Electronic Wallet Browser Plug-in Application 
 
1. SPP Wallet 
The SPP wallet is implemented as a java applet.   
 
2. Java Plug-in V1.3 
JavaTM Plug-in [JavaPlugin] is a product from Sun Microsystems that runs beans 
or applets (written in the Java programming language) in an HTML page using Sun's 
Java virtual machine (JVM).  To launch Java Plug-in, the OBJECT tag and the EMBED tag 
in the HTML specification are used.   The buyer computer must have the Java Plug-in 
installed in order to execute the SPP Wallet application. 
 
3. Web Browser 




The above 3 components work together in the following way.  The buyer submits 
an Order message to the merchant.  The merchant processes the Order message and 
redirects the buyer to the OrderPaymentRequest.jsp page.  This jsp page contains the 
following code snippet: 
 














Plugin tag OBJECT or EMBED not supported by browser.
</NOEMBED></EMBED>
</OBJECT>
The above code snippet is loaded into the Web browser which loads the Java 
applet specified by the 'java_code' tag and the 'java_archive' tag.    The 'java_code' tag 
specifies the applet class and the 'java_archive' tag specifies the jar file where the applet 




6.2.2 SPP Merchant Software 



























1 call ReceiveOrderPrepareOrderPaymentRequest command
2 call ReceiveOrderConfirmationRequestPrepareOrderConfirmation command
3 use SPP Message objects Order, OrderPaymentRequest, 
                                              OrderConfirmationRequest, OrderConfirmation






Figure 6-1 High Level Design of SPP Merchant Software 
 
The details of each component are described below. 
1. Message Flow Commands 
A class diagram of the merchant message flow commands is shown in Figure 6-3.  






























Figure 6-2 SPP Merchant Software Message Flow Commands 
 
 
2. SPP Message Objects and Services 
A class diagram of the SPP Message objects is shown in Figure 6-4.  Each SPP 
message is represented by a class object.  Each object provides helper routines such as 




















Figure 6-3 SPP Message Objects 
3. Cryptographic Services 
The cryptographic services class abstracts the IBM JCE API and provides 
routines to sign messages and verify message signatures.  Figure 6-5 shows a class 
diagram of the CryptographicServices class that displays the services that it performs. 
CryptographicServices
String signMessage(String message, String certificateEncoded, String privateKeyBase64Encoded)
String signMessage(String message, Certificate cert, PrivateKey privateKey)
boolean verifySignedMessage(String message, String signedBase64Message, Certificate cert)
boolean verifySignedMessage(String message, String signedBase64Message, String certBase64Encoded)
 




4. IBM XML4J Parser V3.1.1 
This version of XML4J is based on the Apache Xerces version 1.2.0 [Xerces] 
codebase.  The parser is used for parsing and generating SPP messages.  It also supports 
xml schema [XmlSchema].  The use of xml schema provides a superior way to validate 
xml documents as opposed to traditional DTDs. 
 
5. IBM JCE V1.3 
IBM Java Cryptography Extension V1.3 provides the cryptographic services used 
in the prototype.  The pkcs7 package is an implementation of PKCS #7 Version 1.5 
[PKCS7].   PKCS #7 describes a general syntax for data that may have cryptography 
applied to it, such as digital signatures and digital envelopes. The IBM PKCS 
implementation supports all the content types defined in this standard, such as Data, 
SignedData, and EnvelopedData. 
 
6. OrderProcess command 
The shopper submits the SPP Order message to the merchant by calling the 
OrderProcess command and passing the Order message as a parameter. 
 
7. OrderConfirm command 
The TTP sends the SPP OrderConfirmationRequest message to the merchant’s 
OrderConfirm command.  The OrderConfirm command responds with an 




6.2.3 SPP TTP Software 























   call ReceivePaymentValidationPrepareOrderPaymentReceipt
   call ReceiveOrderPaymentPrepareOrderConfirmationRequest
2 use SPP Message Objects OrderConfirmation, PaymentValidation,
                                               PaymentValidationRequest, OrderPayment
                                               OrderConfirmation, OrderPaymentReceipt
3 use crypto services signMessage(...) and verifySignedMessage(...)
4 use/call relationship
 




A class diagram of the TTP message flow commands is shown in Figure 6-7.  

























Figure 6-6 TTP Software Message Flow Commands 
 
The SPP Message Objects and Services, the Cryptographic Services, the IBM 
XML4J Parser V3.1.1, and the IBM JCE V1.3 are the same as those used in the design of 
the SPP Merchant Software.  All messages sent to the TTP are sent to the 
SPPTTPServlet.  The servlet passes the messages onto the SPP TTP Software component 































Figure 6-8 TTP Database Schema 
 
The TRANSACTION table stores a separate record for each transaction.  Several 
SPP messages are transmitted in a transaction.  These messages are stored in the 
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SPPMSG table.  Each message is of a particular type, e.g., Order, 
OrderPaymentRequest, and OrderPayment and so on.  The SPPMSGTYPE table 
contains a record for each message type that exists in the protocol.  Each record in the 
SPPMSG table is associated to a record in the SPPMSGTYPE table to identify the type 
of message. The MERCHANT and SHOPPER tables identify the merchant and shopper 
respectively in a transaction.  These tables can be further extended to store registration 
information such as name, address, and contact information.  Note that the schema shown 
in Figure 6-8 does not represent the data model required for implementing the protocol in 
a production environment.  For a production environment, the schema would have to 
include information such as billing information, contract information, policy information, 




7 SPP Performance Evaluation 
A performance analysis of the SPP protocol was performed.  Since the dominant 
security technology in the SPP protocol is the use of digital signatures, the digital 
signatures component will have a significant impact on the performance of the protocol.  
The performance of digital signatures is determined by the digital signature provider, the 
signature algorithm used, and the key size.   For the SPP protocol prototype implemented 
for this thesis the security provider was IBM JCE version 1.3.   With this provider, the 
available signature algorithms are MD2withRSA, MD5withRSA, SHA1withRSA and 
SHA1withDSA.   The algorithm used in the prototype implementation was 
SHA1withRSA.  This algorithm uses the SHA1 message digest protocol in combination 
with the RSA encryption protocol. 
We performed experiments to measure the performance of our implementation. 
These experiments are designed to compare the time it takes to complete a single run of 
the protocol using a key size of 512 bits, 1024 bits, 2048 bits as well as disabling the 
digital signatures altogether.  Note that the larger the key size the more difficult it is to 
break the security, but the execution time is expected to be more substantial.  For each of 
the key sizes, we executed a single run of the protocol 10 times and measured the 
completion time, which is defined to be the time from when the TTP receives the Order 
Payment message to when the TTP sends the merchant the Transaction Receipt 
message. This definition of completion time is used because the process from the 
reception of the Order Payment message to the transmission of the Transaction 
Receipt message would under normal circumstances be performed automatically by 
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machines.  This would exclude, for example, the “think” period from when an Order 
Payment Request message was received by the buyer and the subsequent submission of 
the Order Payment message to the TTP.   
Table 6.1 describes the performance results that we have obtained. The machine 
used for doing the experiments was an IBM Thinkpad A22e with 512 MB of RAM 
running the Microsoft Windows 2000 operating system.  The processor is a Pentium III 






















1 2624 3495 4286 9383 
2 2544 3194 4446 9263 
3 2543 3898 5032 8903 
4 2804 3335 4947 9013 
5 2754 3575 4587 9157 
6 2643 3365 5227 9414 
7 2704 3495 4697 9293 
8 3278 3535 4667 9704 
9 2724 3405 5167 9433 
10 2784 3555 5228 9214 
Average 2740.2 3485.2 4848.4 9277.7 
 
Table 7-1 Performance Measurement Results of the SPP Protocol 
 
The results shown in Table 7-1 clearly show the tradeoff between key size and the 
completion time. They also show the impact of the digital signatures component on the 
completion time. Specifically, the completion time is increased by 21%, 77% and 236% 




8 Extension of SPP Protocol for a Two Buyer Scenario 
In this section, we extend the SPP protocol to a two-buyer scenario. In this scenario, 
buyer 1 is the party placing an order with a merchant and buyer 2 is the party who is 
paying for the order.  This feature is desirable as it models some real world shopping 
scenarios such as gift purchases.  For example, assuming Sue is buyer 1 and James is 
buyer 2; on Sue's birthday James would tell Sue to make a purchase at merchant XYZ 
and James will pay for it.   
We first present in subsection 8.1 our protocol design, and then in subsection 8.2 an 
extension to this protocol to improve buyer operation. 
8.1 Design 1 






















1 Buyer 1 sends merchant an Order message 
2 merchant sends buyer 2 an Order Payment Request Notification 
message 
3 buyer 2 sends Merchant a Get Order Payment Request message 
4 merchant sends buyer 2 an Order Payment Request message 
5 buyer 2 sends TTP an Order Payment message 
 
Table 8-1 Details of Steps for our Two-Buyer Protocol 
 
8.1.1 Step 1: Buyer 1 Sends Merchant an Order Message 
In step 1, buyer 1 sends an Order message to the merchant.  This message is the 
same as that described in the single buyer scenario except that the content has been 
extended as follows: 
•  items to be purchased 
•  shipping information 
•  *previously quoted price 
•  *timestamp 
•  email address of buyer 2 
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•  CERTb1 
•  *Sb1(items to be purchases, shipping information, *previously quoted price, 
*timestamp, email address of buyer 2, *CERTb1) 
 
The additional information includes the email address of buyer 2, the certificate of 
buyer 1 and the signature of the message by buyer 1.  The email address of buyer 2 is 
needed because the Order Payment Request Notification message will be sent by the 
merchant to buyer 2.  The Order message is embedded inside the Order Payment Request 
message. When buyer 2 receives the Order Payment Request message, he/she can 
check the Order message and verify the person that actually created the order.  
Note that the message signature is optional.  If the message is not signed then buyer 2 
does not have undeniable proof of who has initiated the order.  The only information that 
buyer 2 would have is the contents of the order which includes some credential 
information such as name of the person and shipping information plus the certificate of 
the buyer 1.  This might be acceptable in some situations.  The advantage of making the 
signature optional is that buyer 1 is not required to install the SPP Electronic Wallet 
application on his/her machine. 
8.1.2 Step 2: Merchant Sends Buyer 2 an Order Payment Request 
Notification Message 
 
The Order Payment Request Notification message is sent to buyer 2 by email.   
The purpose of this message is to notify buyer 2 that an order has been made and it has to 
be approved and paid for.  The information contained in the email message includes: 
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•  *Contents of the order 
•  *Price of the order 
•  *Name of person who created the order 
•  Transaction Id 
 
The reason why this message is delivered by email is because buyer 2 is most likely 
not online at the moment when this message is sent and secondly the destination address 
of buyer 2 is not known until it is provided by buyer 1.  The optional fields in this 
message include contents of the order, price of the order and the name of person who 
created the order.  These fields are optional because for security reasons; one may not 
wish to include this information in an email, where the data transmitted are not protected 
by encryption. The only information that is required is the transaction id.  A secure 
protocol can be used in a subsequent message to obtain the other information that is 
included in the Order Payment Request Notification message. 
8.1.3 Step 3: Buyer 2 Sends Merchant a Get Order Payment Request 
Message 
Buyer 2 sends a Get Order Payment Request message to the merchant.  To 
ensure security, this message is delivered using the https protocol.  A sample message 





8.1.4 Step 4:  Merchant Sends Buyer 2 an Order Payment Request 
Message 
The merchant sends buyer 2 an Order Payment Request message.  The contents of 
this message are as follows; they are the same as those for the single buyer scenario 
except that the Order message, which was embedded inside the Order Payment 
Request message, is also included. 
•  transaction ID, 
•  amount, 
•  Order message, 
•  validity period, 
•  CERTm 
•  *purchase agreement 
•  Sm(transaction ID, amount, Order, validity period, CERTm, *purchase agreement) 
 
The Order message contains the email address of buyer 2 and the certificate of buyer 
1.  The certificate of buyer 1 identifies to buyer 2 the person who initiated the order. 
Buyer 2 may approve the purchase and continue with the transaction.  Alternatively, 
buyer 2 may terminate the transaction by not proceeding. In this case, the timeout 





8.1.5 Step 5: Buyer 2 Sends TTP a Order Payment Message 
This step is exactly the same as that for the single buyer scenario.  All subsequent steps 
are also the same as those for the single buyer scenario. 
 
8.2 Properties of Our Two-Buyer Protocol 
Our two-buyer protocol has the following properties: 
•  Buyer 1 does not have to register with the merchant. 
•  Buyer 2 does not have to register with the merchant. 
•  Buyer 1 has to optionally install the SPP Electronic Wallet application.  If the wallet 
is installed then buyer 1 can sign the Order message and buyer 2 would have 
undeniable proof of the person who has initiated the order.  Note that if buyer 1 does 
not sign the message buyer 2 still has sufficient information to validate the message 
and maintain a reasonable amount of security. 
•  Buyer 1 can view the status of the order at the merchant’s storefront. 
•  Buyer 2 must approve the order made by buyer 1 in order to complete the transaction. 
 
8.3 Extension to Improve Buyer Operation 
























A Buyer 1 registers with the merchant 
B Buyer 2 registers with the merchant 
C Buyer 2 sends a Customer Order Submit Permission List  message 
to the merchant  
Table 8-2 Extra Steps for the Extended Protocol 
 
The motivation for the extension is to solve the problem that no restrictions have 
been placed on the number of order request messages that may be given to buyer 2.  
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Anyone can place an order and ask buyer 2 to approve and pay for it.  This problem is not 
necessarily a security exposure as buyer 2 must approve each and every transaction 
he/she receives.  It is more of an inconvenience and a disturbance.  To prevent this 
situation from occurring, steps A, B and C shown in Figure 9-4 are performed prior to the 
start of a two buyer transaction. 
Step A involves buyer 1 registering with the merchant.  Buyer 1 would obtain a 
logon id after the registration is complete.  Step B involves buyer 2 registering with the 
merchant as well.  Step C involves buyer 2 sending a Customer Order Submit 
Permission List message to the merchant.  The contents of this message are: 
•  List of customer logon ids that can submit an order message that buyer 2 may pay for 
and an upper limit on the dollar amount for an order for each customer on the list. 
•  Logon id of the person creating the list 
 
For example, assuming that Bob and Jack registered with the merchant with the 
respective logon id’s of bob123 and jack456.  A Customer Order Submit Permission 






 The merchant would store this information in its database and only those users on 




9 Conclusions and Future Work 
9.1 Summary 
In this thesis, a security analysis of the SPP protocol was performed. We have 
investigated existing online payment protocol domain to determine a list of desirable 
features of a secure payment protocol. This includes dispute resolution, confidentiality, 
anonymity, non repudiation, message integrity, and availability and reliability. 
The SPP protocol was then analyzed to see if these features are indeed supported. 
We next considered a proof analysis of a secure payment protocol.  The goal was to 
list all of the proofs required by each participant in a payment transaction in order to feel 
secure.  The protocol was analyzed to determine if each proof is supported. For the SPP 
protocol, the participants are the buyer, the merchant, the TTP and the Payment Centre.  
An example of a proof required by the merchant is that the credit card information 
supplied by the buyer really belongs to that buyer and not someone else.   
We found that SPP supports a majority of the desirable features of a secure payment 
protocol and a majority of the proofs listed in the proof analysis.  Even though the 
protocol provides a high level of security, there are further enhancements that can be 
made.  The protocol analysis has led to suggestions that can be used to further enhance 
security.  For example, it was determined that using the cryptographic technique of 
enveloping messages would help increase security.  Also using signed timestamps from a 
timestamp authority would further secure the validity of digital signatures. There is 
however a cost to implementing the extra security enhancements.  In most cases the cost 
is overhead that leads to performance degradation.  Further research is required to 
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determine if the overhead would justify the extra security in each of the security 
enhancements. 
A prototype of the SPP payment protocol was implemented.  The prototype consists 
of three software components, the SPP electronic wallet used by a buyer, SPP merchant 
software and SPP TTP software.  The software architecture of the prototype was 
presented in this thesis.  We have gained significant knowledge about the ideal 
technologies to use to implement such a system.  Also, the prototype is useful for 
performance measurements.  From our experiments, we found that processing in 
connection with digital signatures contributes significantly to the completion time of a 
transaction. We also found that a larger key size provides more security but also requires 
more processing power.   
We have also presented an extension of SPP to support a two buyer scenario. Such an 
extension would allow merchants to offer additional services such as gift services where 
one buyer places an order and another buyer pays for the order. 
9.2 Future Work 
The current SPP protocol description mainly discusses the messages that are 
exchanged between the various parties in a SPP transaction.  The description is at a very 
high level and it only discusses ideas at a conceptual level.  A complete description of the 
protocol would be a valuable piece of documentation. The resulting document would 
essentially be a Software Requirements Specification document.  It would contain more 
specific information such as: 
•  Buyer registration requirements. 
•  Merchant registration requirements. 
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•  Description on how the buyer and merchant obtain the digital certificates. 
•  Discussion about the Certificate Authority (CA). 
•  Policies concerning digital certificates. 
o What specific information needs to be included in the digital certificate?  For 
example, name, address, possibly a one way hash of the credit card number. 
o Certificate expiration policy. 
•  Cryptographic algorithms used for digital signatures and digests (RSA, PGP) 
•  Selecting a certificate revocation schema for validating digital certificates. 
•  Description of the validation algorithms performed for each message by each 
participant in a transaction. 
•  Database model for the TTP. 
•  Use cases describing the various main line scenarios as well as dispute resolution 
scenarios. 
 
For this thesis, a prototype of the payment protocol was implemented and integrated 
with a simulation of a merchant commerce server.  Integrating this protocol with a 
production commerce server such as Websphere Commerce Business Edition [IBMWS] 
would be very valuable proof of concept. 
 Security enhancements to protocol were discussed in Section 5.4.  As future work 
the problems discussed in that section should be analyzed with a goal of obtaining 
solutions that can result in improved security. 
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 A further performance evaluation of the protocol would also be very useful.  
Every security feature comes at a cost and the cost is performance. The following criteria 
could be considered as part of a performance study: 
•  Validation of signed messages using Certificate Revocation Lists (see section 
4.3.4). 
•  Validation of signed messages without using Certificate Revocation Lists. 
•  Validation of signed messages using other revocation mechanisms such as 
Certificate Revocation Trees. 
•  Using digital envelopes (see section 4.3.1). 
•  TTP storing encrypted messages in database (see section 4.3.2). 
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